ieee80211_crypto —
    802.11 cryptographic support
#include
    <net80211/ieee80211_var.h>
  
  void
  
  ieee80211_crypto_register(const
    struct ieee80211_cipher *);
void
  
  ieee80211_crypto_unregister(const
    struct ieee80211_cipher *);
int
  
  ieee80211_crypto_available(int
    cipher);
  
  void
  
  ieee80211_notify_replay_failure(struct
    ieee80211vap *, const struct ieee80211_frame *,
    const struct ieee80211_key *, uint64_t
    rsc, int tid);
void
  
  ieee80211_notify_michael_failure(struct
    ieee80211vap *, const struct ieee80211_frame *,
    u_int keyix);
int
  
  ieee80211_crypto_newkey(struct
    ieee80211vap *, int cipher, int
    flags, struct ieee80211_key *);
int
  
  ieee80211_crypto_setkey(struct
    ieee80211vap *, struct
    ieee80211_key *);
int
  
  ieee80211_crypto_delkey(struct
    ieee80211vap *, struct
    ieee80211_key *);
void
  
  ieee80211_key_update_begin(struct
    ieee80211vap *);
void
  
  ieee80211_key_update_end(struct
    ieee80211vap *);
void
  
  ieee80211_crypto_delglobalkeys(struct
    ieee80211vap *);
void
  
  ieee80211_crypto_reload_keys(struct
    ieee80211com *);
  
  struct ieee80211_key *
  
  ieee80211_crypto_encap(struct
    ieee80211_node *, struct
    mbuf *);
struct ieee80211_key *
  
  ieee80211_crypto_decap(struct
    ieee80211_node *, struct
    mbuf *, int
  flags);
int
  
  ieee80211_crypto_demic(struct
    ieee80211vap *, struct ieee80211_key *,
    struct mbuf *, int force);
int
  
  ieee80211_crypto_enmic(struct
    ieee80211vap *, struct ieee80211_key *,
    struct mbuf *, int force);
The net80211 layer includes comprehensive
    cryptographic support for 802.11 protocols. Software implementations of
    ciphers required by WPA and 802.11i are provided as well as encap/decap
    processing of 802.11 frames. Software ciphers are written as kernel modules
    and register with the core crypto support. The cryptographic framework
    supports hardware acceleration of ciphers by drivers with automatic
    fall-back to software implementations when a driver is unable to provide
    necessary hardware services.
net80211 cipher modules register their
    services using
    ieee80211_crypto_register()
    and supply a template that describes their operation. This
    ieee80211_cipher structure defines protocol-related
    state such as the number of bytes of space in the 802.11 header to
    reserve/remove during encap/decap and entry points for setting up keys and
    doing cryptographic operations.
Cipher modules can associate private state to each key through the
    wk_private structure member. If state is setup by the
    module it will be called before a key is destroyed so it can reclaim
    resources.
Crypto modules can notify the
    system of two events. When a packet replay event is recognized
    ieee80211_notify_replay_failure()
    can be used to signal the event. When a TKIP Michael
    failure is detected
    ieee80211_notify_michael_failure()
    can be invoked. Drivers may also use these routines to signal events
    detected by the hardware.
The net80211 layer implements a per-vap
    4-element “global key table” and a per-station “unicast
    key” for protocols such as WPA, 802.1x, and 802.11i. The global key
    table is designed to support legacy WEP operation and Multicast/Group keys,
    though some applications also use it to implement WPA in station mode. Keys
    in the global table are identified by a key index in the range 0-3.
    Per-station keys are identified by the MAC address of the station and are
    typically used for unicast PTK bindings.
net80211 provides
    ioctl(2)
    operations for managing both global and per-station keys. Drivers typically
    do not participate in software key management; they are involved only when
    providing hardware acceleration of cryptographic operations.
ieee80211_crypto_newkey()
    is used to allocate a new net80211 key or
    reconfigure an existing key. The cipher must be specified along with any
    fixed key index. The net80211 layer will handle
    allocating cipher and driver resources to support the key.
Once a key is allocated it's contents
    can be set using
    ieee80211_crypto_setkey()
    and deleted with
    ieee80211_crypto_delkey()
    (with any cipher and driver resources reclaimed).
ieee80211_crypto_delglobalkeys()
    is used to reclaim all keys in the global key table for a vap; it typically
    is used only within the net80211 layer.
ieee80211_crypto_reload_keys()
    handles hardware key state reloading from software key state, such as
    required after a suspend/resume cycle.
Drivers identify ciphers they have hardware support for through
    the ic_cryptocaps field of the
    ieee80211com structure. If hardware support is
    available then a driver should also fill in the
    iv_key_alloc, iv_key_set,
    and iv_key_delete methods of each
    ieee80211vap created for use with the device. In
    addition the methods iv_key_update_begin and
    iv_key_update_end can be setup to handle
    synchronization requirements for updating hardware key state.
When net80211 allocates a software key and
    the driver can accelerate the cipher operations the
    iv_key_alloc method will be invoked. Drivers may
    return a token that is associated with outbound traffic (for use in
    encrypting frames). Otherwise, e.g. if hardware resources are not available,
    the driver will not return a token and net80211 will
    arrange to do the work in software and pass frames to the driver that are
    already prepared for transmission.
For receive, drivers mark frames with the
    M_WEP mbuf flag to indicate the hardware has
    decrypted the payload. If frames have the
    IEEE80211_FC1_PROTECTED bit marked in their 802.11
    header and are not tagged with M_WEP then decryption
    is done in software. For more complicated scenarios the software key state
    is consulted; e.g. to decide if Michael verification needs to be done in
    software after the hardware has handled TKIP decryption.
Drivers that manage complicated
    key data structures, e.g. faulting software keys into a hardware key cache,
    can safely manipulate software key state by bracketing their work with calls
    to
    ieee80211_key_update_begin()
    and
    ieee80211_key_update_end().
    These calls also synchronize hardware key state update when receive traffic
    is active.