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    | GSS_ACCEPT_SEC_CONTEXT(3) | 
    FreeBSD Library Functions Manual (prm) | 
    GSS_ACCEPT_SEC_CONTEXT(3) | 
   
 
gss_accept_sec_context —
    Accept a security context initiated by a peer
    application 
#include
    <gssapi/gssapi.h> 
OM_uint32
   
  gss_accept_sec_context(OM_uint32
    *minor_status, gss_ctx_id_t *context_handle,
    const gss_cred_id_t acceptor_cred_handle,
    const gss_buffer_t input_token_buffer,
    const gss_channel_bindings_t input_chan_bindings,
    const gss_name_t *src_name, gss_OID
    *mech_type, gss_buffer_t output_token,
    OM_uint32 *ret_flags, OM_uint32
    *time_rec, gss_cred_id_t
    *delegated_cred_handle); 
Allows a remotely initiated security context between the
    application and a remote peer to be established. The routine may return a
    output_token which should be transferred to the peer
    application, where the peer application will present it to
    gss_init_sec_context(3).
    If no token need be sent,
    gss_accept_sec_context()
    will indicate this by setting the length field of the
    output_token argument to zero. To complete the context
    establishment, one or more reply tokens may be required from the peer
    application; if so, gss_accept_sec_context() will
    return a status flag of GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED,
    in which case it should be called again when the
    reply token is received from the peer application, passing the token to
    gss_accept_sec_context() via the
    input_token parameters. 
Portable applications should be
    constructed to use the token length and return status to determine whether a
    token needs to be sent or waited for. Thus a typical portable caller should
    always invoke
    gss_accept_sec_context()
    within a loop: 
gss_ctx_id_t context_hdl = GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT;
do {
  receive_token_from_peer(input_token);
  maj_stat = gss_accept_sec_context(&min_stat,
				    &context_hdl,
				    cred_hdl,
				    input_token,
				    input_bindings,
				    &client_name,
				    &mech_type,
				    output_token,
				    &ret_flags,
				    &time_rec,
				    &deleg_cred);
  if (GSS_ERROR(maj_stat)) {
    report_error(maj_stat, min_stat);
  };
  if (output_token->length != 0) {
    send_token_to_peer(output_token);
    gss_release_buffer(&min_stat, output_token);
  };
  if (GSS_ERROR(maj_stat)) {
    if (context_hdl != GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT)
      gss_delete_sec_context(&min_stat,
			     &context_hdl,
			     GSS_C_NO_BUFFER);
    break;
  };
} while (maj_stat & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED);
 
Whenever the routine returns a major status that includes the
    value GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED, the
    context is not fully established and the following restrictions apply
    to the output parameters: 
The value returned via the time_rec
    parameter is undefined unless the accompanying
    ret_flags parameter contains the bit
    GSS_C_PROT_READY_FLAG, indicating
    that per-message services may be applied in advance of a successful
    completion status, the value returned via the
    mech_type parameter may be undefined until the routine
    returns a major status value of GSS_S_COMPLETE. 
The values of the GSS_C_DELEG_FLAG,
    GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG,
    GSS_C_REPLAY_FLAG,
    GSS_C_SEQUENCE_FLAG,
    GSS_C_CONF_FLAG,
    GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG and
    GSS_C_ANON_FLAG bits returned via the
    ret_flags parameter should contain the values that the
    implementation expects would be valid if context establishment were to
    succeed. 
The values of the
    GSS_C_PROT_READY_FLAG and
    GSS_C_TRANS_FLAG bits within
    ret_flags should indicate the actual state at the time
    gss_accept_sec_context()
    returns, whether or not the context is fully established. 
Although this requires that GSS-API implementations set the
    GSS_C_PROT_READY_FLAG in the final
    ret_flags returned to a caller (i.e. when accompanied
    by a GSS_S_COMPLETE status code), applications
    should not rely on this behavior as the flag was not defined in Version 1 of
    the GSS-API. Instead, applications should be prepared to use per-message
    services after a successful context establishment, according to the
    GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG and
    GSS_C_CONF_FLAG values. 
All other bits within the ret_flags argument
    should be set to zero. While the routine returns
    GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED, the values
    returned via the ret_flags argument indicate
    the services that the implementation expects to be available from the
    established context. 
If the initial call of
    gss_accept_sec_context()
    fails, the implementation should not create a context object, and should
    leave the value of the context_handle parameter set to
    GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT to indicate this. In the event of a
    failure on a subsequent call, the implementation is permitted to delete the
    "half-built" security context (in which case it should set the
    context_handle parameter to
    GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT ), but the preferred behavior is to leave
    the security context (and the context_handle parameter) untouched for
    the application to delete (using
    gss_delete_sec_context(3)
    ). 
During context establishment, the informational status bits
    GSS_S_OLD_TOKEN and
    GSS_S_DUPLICATE_TOKEN indicate fatal errors, and
    GSS-API mechanisms should always return them in association with a routine
    error of GSS_S_FAILURE. This
    requirement for pairing did not exist in version 1 of the GSS-API
    specification, so applications that wish to run over version 1
    implementations must special-case these codes. 
  - context_handle
 
  - Context handle for new context. Supply 
GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT
      for first call; use value returned in subsequent calls. Once
      gss_accept_sec_context()
      has returned a value via this parameter, resources have been assigned to
      the corresponding context, and must be freed by the application after use
      with a call to
      gss_delete_sec_context(3). 
  - acceptor_cred_handle
 
  - Credential handle claimed by context acceptor. Specify
      
GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL to accept the context as a
      default principal. If GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL is
      specified, but no default acceptor principal is defined,
      GSS_S_NO_CRED will be returned. 
  - input_token_buffer
 
  - Token obtained from remote application.
 
  - input_chan_bindings
 
  - Application-specified bindings. Allows application to securely bind
      channel identification information to the security context. If channel
      bindings are not used, specify
      
GSS_C_NO_CHANNEL_BINDINGS. 
  - src_name
 
  - Authenticated name of context initiator. After use, this name should be
      deallocated by passing it to
      gss_release_name(3).
      If not required, specify 
NULL. 
  - mech_type
 
  - Security mechanism used. The returned OID value will be a pointer into
      static storage, and should be treated as read-only by the caller (in
      particular, it does not need to be freed). If not required, specify
      
NULL. 
  - output_token
 
  - Token to be passed to peer application. If the length field of the
      returned token buffer is 0, then no token need be passed to the peer
      application. If a non-zero length field is returned, the associated
      storage must be freed after use by the application with a call to
      gss_release_buffer(3).
 
  - ret_flags
 
  - Contains various independent flags, each of which indicates that the
      context supports a specific service option. If not needed, specify
      
NULL. Symbolic names are provided for each flag,
      and the symbolic names corresponding to the required flags should be
      logically-ANDed with the ret_flags value to test
      whether a given option is supported by the context. The flags are:
    
      - GSS_C_DELEG_FLAG
 
      - 
        
          - True
 
          - Delegated credentials are available via the delegated_cred_handle
              parameter
 
          - False
 
          - No credentials were delegated
 
         
       
      - GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG
 
      - 
        
          - True
 
          - Remote peer asked for mutual authentication
 
          - False
 
          - Remote peer did not ask for mutual authentication
 
         
       
      - GSS_C_REPLAY_FLAG
 
      - 
        
          - True
 
          - Replay of protected messages will be detected
 
          - False
 
          - Replayed messages will not be detected
 
         
       
      - GSS_C_SEQUENCE_FLAG
 
      - 
        
          - True
 
          - Out-of-sequence protected messages will be detected
 
          - False
 
          - Out-of-sequence messages will not be detected
 
         
       
      - GSS_C_CONF_FLAG
 
      - 
        
          - True
 
          - Confidentiality service may be invoked by calling the
              gss_wrap(3)
              routine
 
          - False
 
          - No confidentiality service (via
              gss_wrap(3))
              available.
              gss_wrap(3)
              will provide message encapsulation, data-origin authentication and
              integrity services only.
 
         
       
      - GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG
 
      - 
        
          - True
 
          - Integrity service may be invoked by calling either
              gss_get_mic(3)
              or
              gss_wrap(3)
              routines.
 
          - False
 
          - Per-message integrity service unavailable.
 
         
       
      - GSS_C_ANON_FLAG
 
      - 
        
          - True
 
          - The initiator does not wish to be authenticated; the
              src_name parameter (if requested) contains
              an anonymous internal name.
 
          - False
 
          - The initiator has been authenticated normally.
 
         
       
      - GSS_C_PROT_READY_FLAG
 
      - 
        
          - True
 
          - Protection services (as specified by the states of the
              
GSS_C_CONF_FLAG and
              GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG) are available if the
              accompanying major status return value is either
              GSS_S_COMPLETE or
              GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED. 
          - False
 
          - Protection services (as specified by the states of the
              
GSS_C_CONF_FLAG and
              GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG) are available only if
              the accompanying major status return value is
              GSS_S_COMPLETE. 
         
       
      - GSS_C_TRANS_FLAG
 
      - 
        
          - True
 
          - The resultant security context may be transferred to other
              processes via a call to
              gss_export_sec_context(3).
 
          - False
 
          - The security context is not transferable.
 
         
       
     
    All other bits should be set to zero. 
   
  - time_rec
 
  - Number of seconds for which the context will remain valid. Specify
      
NULL if not required. 
  - delegated_cred_handle
 
  - Credential handle for credentials received from context initiator. Only
      valid if 
GSS_C_DELEG_FLAG in
      ret_flags is true, in which case an explicit
      credential handle (i.e. not GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL)
      will be returned; if false,
      gss_accept_context()
      will set this parameter to GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL. If
      a credential handle is returned, the associated resources must be released
      by the application after use with a call to
      gss_release_cred(3).
      Specify NULL if not required. 
  - minor_status
 
  - Mechanism specific status code.
 
 
  - GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED
 
  - Indicates that a token from the peer application is required to complete
      the context, and that gss_accept_sec_context must be called again with
      that token.
 
  - GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN
 
  - Indicates that consistency checks performed on the input_token
    failed.
 
  - GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_CREDENTIAL
 
  - Indicates that consistency checks performed on the credential failed.
 
  - GSS_S_NO_CRED
 
  - The supplied credentials were not valid for context acceptance, or the
      credential handle did not reference any credentials.
 
  - GSS_S_CREDENTIALS_EXPIRED
 
  - The referenced credentials have expired.
 
  - GSS_S_BAD_BINDINGS
 
  - The input_token contains different channel bindings to those specified via
      the input_chan_bindings parameter.
 
  - GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT
 
  - Indicates that the supplied context handle did not refer to a valid
      context.
 
  - GSS_S_BAD_SIG
 
  - The input_token contains an invalid MIC.
 
  - GSS_S_OLD_TOKEN
 
  - The input_token was too old. This is a fatal error during context
      establishment.
 
  - GSS_S_DUPLICATE_TOKEN
 
  - The input_token is valid, but is a duplicate of a token already processed.
      This is a fatal error during context establishment.
 
  - GSS_S_BAD_MECH
 
  - The received token specified a mechanism that is not supported by the
      implementation or the provided credential.
 
 
  - RFC 2743
 
  - Generic Security Service Application Program Interface Version 2, Update
    1
 
  - RFC 2744
 
  - Generic Security Service API Version 2 : C-bindings
 
 
The gss_accept_sec_context function first
    appeared in FreeBSD 7.0. 
John Wray, Iris Associates 
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